In his recent book. An Aesthetic Occupation: The Immediacy of Architecture and the Palestine Conflict {Durham: Duke University Press, 20021, Daniel Monk analyzes the history of the use of architecture as a rhetorical device by the "political actors" of the Palestine/Israel conflict to construct political "immediacy. " In other words. Monk explores how monuments have been used as pivots in a narrative to form an understandable, yet invisible, line of cause and effect. Monk is the first historian to break the conflict into the constituent parts which have come to represent it. He shows that as the participants and observers of the conflict make use of these seemingly concrete objects for justification or make use of them for clarification, the conflict becomesparadoxically-more abstract. The very nature of a conflict over territory, political autonomy, and national borders in what is called the "Holy Land" lends itself to the denial of liability and to the perpetuation of the conflict itself. As such, this book is the narrative of a prehistory taken for granted in most other histories of contested sites. In this interview with Daniel Monk on November 17, 2002, he discussed how, throughout the history of the conflict, religion has, under various pretexts, helped to render claims for territory and monuments irrefutable.
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Could you set your book in a critical, personal, and historiographical context for us? It would be fair to say that An Aestfietic Occupation is really a repudiation of my own earlier efforts to explain the relation between monuments and mass violence in the context of the Middle East conflict. In the first instance, this book is a history of the normative understanding of the relation between architecture and politics, and as such, of my own prior beliefs. This normative explanation is one of immediacy, of a presumption that it is possible to point to architecture and to see a political reality at work in it. ..directly and without mediation. More specifically, throughout the modern history of this conflict, political actors and interpreters of this struggle have pointed to architecture each time they felt compelled to explain the cause of a mass violence they privilege as historically transformative. Here, architecture confirms two reciprocal theories of historical change, two seemingly opposed accounts that are. In reality, only one: shrines and holy sites either confirm an incited violence, or conversely, they ratify an organic, spontaneous, violencei.e., a violence triggered by the disruption of a transitive relation between people and shrines.
What I have tried to do, then, is to write a history of these reciprocal positions with the purpose of estranging them and, more importantly, with the hope of showing how the unitary vision of history that gives rise to them is untenable. Which is not to suggest that I think that monuments have no relation to politics; rather, I am concerned with the politics disclosed by a struggle's repeated efforts to assert a relation of immediacy between architecture and history, since there what one stumbles over is this conflict's normalized incapacity to account for itself. To take matters even further: if I suggest that this normalized incapacity of a conflict to account for itself could be described as a "collusive communicative framework"that is, a tacit consensus at the heart of a struggleit is in order to ask what might be disclosed about history itself in a context where the dramaturgical organization of political experience introduces itself as an absolute, as a structural abstraction.
Would it be possible for us, then, to define architectural modernism in general as a belief in immediacy? Maybe. In the sense that after Hegel unpacks the Pandora's boxthat is, advances methodically through the universality of mediationa huge effort to re-identify the concrete with the immediate would be expended in subsequent philosophies and architectural theories. I am talking about the demand for a return to quasi-"phrenological" thinking.
but In ways that are cognizant of the fact that this demand has Itself been subjected to philosophical reflection on Its historical status, that Is, to critique. This Is why I believe there is a significant quotient of voodoo in modernist architecture and architectural thought: a mysticism that cannot be explained awayas some have doneby recourse to arguments for a lag between technological advances and social organization, or worse, to the fiction of a tectonic rationality emerging out of a romanticism eventually shed, like the hangovers of another era.
But let me contrast European High Modernism with
Palestine, since this pairing is actually instructive vis-a-vis the triumph of modernism. If one looks to the example of the Neue Sachlichkeit, for example. It Is evident that In Weimar Germany the public as a whole was relatively unaware of, felt indifferent to, or was downright suspicious of Intellectuals' claims concerning art and architecture's immediacy to politics. (Walter Benjamin famously described the Neue Sachlichkeit as a bluff, suggesting that Its claims to immediacy were much like the Baron Munchausen's assertion that he pulled himself out of the bog by his own hair). In this sense, high modernism is wimpy If judged by the criterion of Its demand for a "phrenological" formal politics In the context of universal mediation.
By contrast, what Is so striking about the Interpretation of architecture In the political history of Israel/Palestine Is that participants In and observers of this struggle assumed the monument's adequacy to history to be self-evident. Though cognizant of the problems of representation, Ideology, mediation. ..they nevertheless advance arguments concerning the nature of architecture's adequacy to politics. In their modernism, the proximate relation of architecture to actuality is so complete that it explains history, requiring no historical explanation. (There are really good historical reasons for this, as I try to show In the book. I discuss political actors whose intellectual projects necessarily began with the demystlflcatlon of religious Invocations of the "concrete" in order to advance secular, political demands for architecture's identification with the history for which It nominally stands). Pointing beyond the arguments for modernism In the Weimar claims for the concretewhich emerged In the political opponents "mutually-assessed mutual assessment"ratifies an abstract actuality all the more successfully. The Interpretation of a conflict became a constitutive factor in its perpetuation.
What about the Cold War? Do you see that as an analogous situation?
Absolutely. But the "strategic Interaction" of Cold War politics elucidates the points about modernism I've just raised.
In the case of the Cold War, two actors in oppositionand their surrogatesarrived at a common thematlzatlon of reality. This has been written about by deterrence theorists and political scientists like Robert Jervis In his famous The Logic of Images in International Relations, or Thomas Schelling in his Strategy of Conflict, or Waltz In his Man, the State and War. Viewed through the lens of Goffman's Strategic Interactionanoxhet classic of the eraone could say that despite their important disagreements, these students of politics (and I think they're really theorists of gestures) advance a view in which states are performative entities and subjects are strategic beingsstrategic subjects/performative states. But as unlikely as it may seem given the commonly-held view that there is a direct correlation between modernism and development, this kind of strategic Interaction was already old-hat in the 1960s In Israel and Palestine. In very specific ways, by 1967 It had been taken to two levels of abstraction higher than the classic gestural brinksmanship that one witnesses In U.S. /Soviet relations. Let me add that I'm not unaware of the fact that the stakes were obviously much higher In the Cuban missile crisis, for example, than In the build up to the war of June 1967 In the Middle East. But viewed in light of the categories of political comportment advanced by the deterrence theory of Its own time, what had been taking place in the Middle East during its modern history far exceeded the "logic" to which these thinkers tried to assign a name. It looks at the Immediate aftereffects of the hostilities of 1967 and especially at the way political actors sought to identify the causes of their new historical situation during a period that would eventually come to be known as the "era of euphoria" In Israel, and the "great setback" In the Arab world. This Investigation builds on the methods of An Aesthetic Occupation by chronicling how parties to this conflict made sense of their opponents' attempts to make sense of the causes of war. However, while the first volume records the way political actors tried (without much suc-MONK,' 21 cess) to postulate the political instrumentality of symbols and images in explanations of violence, this work examines a subsequent generation's efforts to locate the causes of war in the se//-image of the peoples involved. (And more specifically, in the self-image of political actors betrayed in their own assessments of their opponent's self-image). If this sounds abstract, it is because those involved in explaining a new political reality actually advanced an abstract politics: from Sadiq al-'Azm's Self-Criticism After the Defeat, to assessments of these assessments such as Yehoshafat Harkabi's Arab Lessons From Their Defeat, to immanent critiques of the Israeli meta-critical position (like the young Edward Said's "The Arab Portrayed"), arguments implicating the self-image of one's opponent in the instigation of violence advanced a new consensus concerning the nature of historical change.
How does the idea of allegory come into play In your book? I guess the short answer might be this; in the ways in which the political actors themselves debate, theorize, and advance arguments for the role of architecture in their own political reality, they reveal a constitutive relation between allegory and history. But this is a remarkably complex relation. Here, allegory is not merely taken to mean the concatenation of conventional symbolsthe "extended symbol" that would explain, for example, what is signified by the features of the statue of Jose de San Martin's statue at the entrance to Central Park: a sword up or a sword down, a horse rearing or with its head bent down, the hero touching his cap, and looking to the east or west, etc. Rather, what I'm exploring in An Aesthetic Occupation is a relation to allegory far less estranged from collective experience than the one I've just described; the way in which the political actors whose adventures I tell understand and advance their own understanding of their own historical circumstances discloses itself as having a concrete relationship to time that is the same as the one we have come to describe in allegory. In a tradition of thinking originating in Georg Lukacs and elaborated in Walter Benjamin's philosophy of history that sees allegory first, as a charnell-house of longrotted inferiorities, and then, as the via negativa to revolutionary experience, it is a cipher language of history. ("From the standpoint of death, the product of the corpse is life,"
Benjamin instructs the reader of his Trauerspiel study).
In the conclusion of your book you make a strong claim about ethics. Could you expand upon It?
First, let me say that the conclusion of An Aesthetic Occupation is a work of self-criticism. (I should add that this is a critique that is much harsher than any of the reviews of this book I've read to date). But I am not in any sense offering this gesture of self-criticism as a pragmatic model for an ethics. This is not a book that suggests that the identification of a problem is a step in its resolution. Instead, like others before me, I'm suggesting that critique is its own end.
And critique of a particular kind: a critique that is inherently negative in its orientation, in the sense that it displays "intransigence towards all reification"as Adorno once described the task of his own negative dialectics. Such intransigence does not only extend to assertions that history fulfills itself in stone, but also to claims concerning the successful and complete demystification of such assertions.
The ethical imperative I raise lies precisely in An Aesthetic Occupation's own unfinished business. If in this work I suggest that the claim of architecture's political immediacy signals the violent success of an impossible understanding of history-as-reconciled-existence, then far more important would be to show that the possibility of, and the legitimate demand for, a reconciled existence survives in our failure to articulate the impossibility of reconciliation in this one.
Could you speak a little about the structure of your book? Why do you move from "stone," to "tile," to "paper," and to "celluloid?" Are you suggesting "the march of the world spirit?" Well, I am suggesting a kind of progression, but I am not in any sense suggesting that it coincides with the "march of the world spirit." If I trace how modes of historical selfpresentation advanced towards greater complexity of abstraction, it is not with the aim of implying a drive towards ever greater universality. This is the case in the Phenomenology, which culminates with Spirit's self-cognizance as Absolute Knowing, or in subsequent materialist versions that posited the completion of thought in the proletariat's self-cognizance as the subject/object of History.
The dynamic I present corresponds with something closer to an effort to "keep up appearances" in the face of repeated challenges to those whose political task is to "keep up appearances". ..i.e., to articulate the relation between "facts" on the ground and facts "on the ground." In historical terms, "stone," "tile," "paper," and so on are just shorthand terms for that process.
The book begins with a history of the argument that holy sites are instantiations of revelation. The portion called "stone" documents how this position was eclipsed by another that emerged precisely in expressions of skepticism concerning the first. In the critique of the adequacy of mon-uments to history advanced in religious devotion, a belief in the adequacy of architecture to history was sustained all along. ..in the assertion that in their "untruth" as authentic holy sites they are true instantiations of secular realpolitik.
There are corresponding claims in "Tile"that the true state of affairs could be discerned by the way one's opponents used architecturethat is, treated it as the covering image for their own political imperatives. So, we pass from a magical theory of adequation to an operative one. After the riots that took place in Palestine in 1929, this tenuous, but normative understanding of the relation of architecture to politics also collapsed. Now, parties to this conflict would argue that history presents itself directly in the untruth of one's opponents' claims for the uses of monuments. This is why, in the section entitled "Paper," I present the history of the arguments advanced by representatives for the Zionist and Palestinian leadership before a Parliamentary commission of inquiry on the causes of the violence of 1929. By this point, parties to this conflict resort to a remarkable argument: "history inheres in the way that that guy says I use monuments." They point to actual pictures of shrines in order to make this case. If I suggest that this is a movement towards abstraction, it is because I think it is incumbent upon us to ask: what is the character of a history in which political leaders, arguing for the very possibility of their constituents' existence in a country, find themselves obligated to theorize about what pictures mean? How do they find themselves resorting to a kind of art criticism? While many political histories have normalized this question into oblivion by treating the images as "propaganda"that is, as merely contingent upon a political imperative taking place less abstractly elsewhere -I focus instead on the fact that nobody has been able to articulate what those larger political imperatives are without resorting to these precise claims for the immediacy of architecture to historythis time, as something utterly contingent upon a politics it is supposed to name.
What can you tell us about your current work? How does it relate to the themes found in this book? An Aesthetic Occupation connects with a crucial moment in the history of the gesture. I wasn't completely aware of this as I was writing it. In another of the projects I'm currently developing, I am trying to present the history of the gesture in a novel way informed by what I've learned so far: that is, tracing the history of the gesture by examining the epistemological frameworks in which it presented itself as an urgent problem. I start with Winkelmann and Lessing who were asking themselves whether some poor sculpture was suffering its pain in calm repose or not, since for them the possibility of a modern theory of expression would be contingent upon the answer. Following romantic theories of sentimentality to the origins of modern psychology, I connect these (by virtue of their subsequent rejection of psychological "parallelism") to the sociology of Herbert Mead and his notion of "symbolic interaction." It is a short step from here to the modern politics of the Cold War and to the issues we discussed a little while ago, by which political actors expended huge intellectual efforts to arrive at a reliable understanding of gesture. Combining Mead's notion of a "conversation of gestures" with Charles Sanders Peirce's pragmaticist understanding of language, political scientists would attempt to find a way to arrive at a "taxonomy" capable of distinguishing between "phony" and "real" gestures (they called the former signals and the latter indexes).
The critique of this kind of "taxonomy" was advanced by Erving Goffman, who, in treating the dramaturgy of such gestures , rejected the implicit claims of symbolic interactions concerning the "uses" of images in political experience. He suggested instead that the belief in uses was itself a gesture of agency. In An Aesthetic Occupation, I did not know that I was looking at a part of this history, but I'm quite eager to pursue it.
So what relationships have you been finding between aesthetics and politics in your current research? For the last number of years, I've been looking at the aesthetics implicit in practical political life, particularly the theories of figuration presupposed in modern politics. When I open a work of political science, I often discover that important and credible theories of politics hold presumptions concerning representation that were abandoned at the end of the eighteenth century by credible students of aesthetics. I don't say this to indict them, but to suggest that I've been trying to understand the epistemological horizons of political actors and their interpreters. At the same time, as circumstances have led me to delve deeply into politics and political thought, I have the uncomfortable sense that the humanities have all too often relied on vulgar reductions of politics, and more specifically, on conceptions of power as an undifferentiated absolute. I am increasingly more curious and skeptical about this tendency, as it has been advanced in recent and current arguments about the way culturevisual, material, etc.constitutes a nexus of power. My concern is that this identification of politics-qua-power may signal, more than anything else, a way in which we pay tribute to our own renunzciation and even extract a certain frisson from It.
